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Operation transitions are an essential framework for addressing tactical tasks with strategic resources in support of national end states. Operation transitions identify and plan for objectives that achieve end states. Operation transitions allow for the discovery, planning and prioritization of complex problem resolution through intermediate military objectives (IMOs) from pre to post-conflict operations. Through IMOs, a COCOM can forecast resource requirements early to sustain tactical service units and supporting United States Government (USG) Agencies along operation transitions from deployment to redeployment. Identified IMOs, in conjunction with operation transitions, allow for the translation of strategic guidance to tactical military and civilian tasks to facilitate the operation. Once operation transitions are developed, they provide a coherent context in which to discuss operation support with USG Agencies in meeting national end states. In the event that USG Agencies are unable to support a military contingency, the COCOM can then utilize operation transitions to enable military synchronization of stability operations.

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JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL

OPERATION TRANSITIONS, A FRAMEWORK FOR OPERATION CLOSURE

by

Jonathan A. Otto

Major, United States Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

Signature: _____

02 APRIL 2010

Thesis Adviser: LT Gen (Ret.) Charles Cunningham,

ABSTRACT

Operation transitions are an essential framework for addressing tactical tasks with strategic resources in support of national end states. Operation transitions identify and plan for objectives that achieve end states. Operation transitions allow for the discovery, planning and prioritization of complex problem resolution through intermediate military objectives (IMOs) from pre to post-conflict operations. Through IMOs, a COCOM can forecast resource requirements early to sustain tactical service units and supporting United States Government (USG) Agencies along operation transitions from deployment to redeployment. Identified IMOs, in conjunction with operation transitions, allow for the translation of strategic guidance to tactical military and civilian tasks to facilitate the operation. Once operation transitions are developed, they provide a coherent context in which to discuss operation support with USG Agencies in meeting national end states. In the event that USG Agencies are unable to support a military contingency, the COCOM can then utilize operation transitions to enable military synchronization of stability operations.

The research methodology for this paper consists of: a review of joint and service doctrine, a historical review of transitions and their definitions, a review of contemporary problem identification and problem solving. The paper is also reflective of the personal knowledge and the greater intellectual debate on the ability to define progress during operations, responsibilities of the military and USG Agencies once conventional warfare has culminated and stability or peace operations are required.

The author concludes that operation transitions are an essential framework in support of national end states. The ability to plan, forecast and execute tactical and operational operation transition is essential to achieving national end states to bear in timely matter. In defining the problem and identifying intermediate military objective aligned with operation transitions, estimated resources and costs can be forecasted and set in support of tactical units prior to the execution of the mission. Operation transitions can provide a common strategic to tactical understanding of the requirements in support of a holistic view of the operations in the light of a perceived national risk. Operation transitions and associated intermediate military objectives support the tactical task navigation through the joint phases to support an operation plan. Therefore it is the authors conclusion that operation transitions are an essential for addressing tactical tasks with strategic resources in support of national end states. .

To my family, greater military family and friends.

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I wish to thank all those who helped and inspired me to continue on this topic. Without them, I could not have completed this thesis.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

"Planning problems are inherently wicked."[1]

The United States Armed Forces can ill-afford, both monetarily and politically, continued uncoordinated and segmented planning and execution in current persistent conflicts and future military engagements.[2] Operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Haiti are reflections of the prolonged and unforecasted, political and military engagement of the United States and its coalition partners in persistent conflict over the past two decades.[3] The United States civilian leadership is asking for and requires greater understanding and transparency in military operations, as well the long term costs, risks and benefits. In order to meet the new requirements of this new environment, military planning must change.

Thus the author's thesis is: Operation transitions are an essential framework for addressing tactical tasks with strategic resources in support of national end states. Combatant commanders and planners need to develop, coordinate and synchronize holistic plans for complex operations that meet national end states. Holistic plans require clear guidance and achievable requirements while generating the national support and resources to subordinate commands. These plans need to be dynamic in resolving the growing morass of national and regional political and social problems resident in future conflicts. Plans need to be tactically and strategically viable, feasible and suitable to the

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[1] Rittel, H. and Webber, M, 1973, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 4, pp 155-169. *Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Inc: Amsterdam*, p. 160.

[2] Eichengreen, Barry, "The Dollar Dilemma, The World's Top Currency Faces Competition," *Foreign Affairs,* (September/October 2009): 53-68.

[3] Garamone, Jim, "Gen. Casey Says Army Must Be Prepared for 'Persistent Conflict'," American Forces Press Service, (15 May 2007).

United States civilian leadership and its constituency. Soldiers and leaders are required to carry out their mission understanding the operations, military and national end states and the impacts of tactical actions while communicating these actions to a global population. Failure to meet these requirements in the future will result in unsustainable plans disconnected from the national end states that will exceed the moral and physical costs of the nation.

This research report will focus on why operation transitions are critically important to the development of operation and contingency plans. The research defines operation transitions, briefly analyzes why transitions are ill defined, and identifies shortfalls in doctrine and why those deficiencies are important. The research will then describe in detail the use of operation transitions, subjective and objective measures of effectiveness, decision points, intermediate military objectives (IMOs), military and national end states in support of planning for "ill-defined" and "wicked" problems in the current operating environment.[4] Lastly, the author recommends planning considerations for the use of operation transition in the integration and synchronization of internal planning in conjunction with United States Armed Services, government agencies, coalition partners and non-government organizations.

Planners at the combatant command often create operation plans (OPLANs) and contingency plans (CONPLANs). These plans are intended to facilitate the execution of a timely political, humanitarian or military response to a crisis that affects the United States and its coalition partners. Unfortunately, the planning detail required to address

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[4] Rittel, H., and Webber, M., 1973, p. 160

political and social problems in a complex operation, post conflict is not developed.[5]

Past operational plans define the mission regarding the military capability to meet its end

states in the conduct of conventional warfare and support to stability operations. All too

often post World War II plans have not addressed the national resources and capabilities

required for support through the execution of the entire operation.

Combatant command (COCOM) planners must develop a greater appreciation for

ill-structured problems and interactive complexity in military operations when

developing all encompassing OPLANs and CONPLANs. [6] Commanders and planners

need to develop contingency and operation plans that address, support and resource

combat operations and the political and social problems of stability operations.[7]

Operation transitions are an approach to addressing ill-structured problems within

complex operations early in the planning process to address identification of the

problem(s), support and resource requirements.[8]

The author uses the following definition for "transitions." Transitions occur

between joint operational phases, as identified in the Joint Operations Planning Process

(JOPP), are referred to as "operation transitions" for the rest of this thesis.[9] The author's

working definition for *operation transition* is the movement, development, or evolution

from one distinct operational phase to a subsequent operational phase.

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[5] Schnaubelt, Christopher M., "Complex Operations and Interagency Operational Art," Center for Complex Operations, *PRISM* Vol. I, No. 1, (December 2009): p. 38.

[6] U.S. Department of the Army, 2008, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500 Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design, *U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command*, January 28, pps. 6-9

[7] U.S. Department of the Army, 2008, FM 3-07. Stability Operations, U.S. Government Printing Office, 6 October 2008.

[8] Rittel, H., and Webber, M., 1973, p.162

[9] U.S. Department of Defense, JP 5-0. Joint Operation Planning, U.S. Government Printing Office, 26 December 2006, p. IV-33.

Operation transitions are useful in the identification of a coherent path to resolution or mitigation of ill-structured problems upon the completion of combat operation.[10] Other important factors as defined in Joint Publication 2-01.3 include: situational awareness, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment (JIPOE) and basic understanding of a disagreement across political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information (PMESII) to identify quickly the problems in conflict with national end states.[11] Once identified, the steps to problem resolution are developed into intermediate military objectives (IMOs) along operation transitions in support of military and national end states.

Lastly, operation transitions allow for the alignment of support and resource requirements prior to the execution of IMOs within a phase of a contingency or operation plan. According to researchers at the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, tactical perspective needs to be maintained and achievable objectives resourced.

> The aphorism that "strategy proposes but tactics disposes" is valid. Unless strategy includes a tactical view, it may seek objectives, which are practically unachievable, or it may miscalculate the costs and benefits likely to emerge from a conflict.[12]

Kelly and Brennan appear to be correct in their analysis of the disappearing divide between strategic plans and tactical execution. Operation transitions forecasting national resources to address tactical decisive points in the creation and development of IMOs that

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[10] Rittel, H., and Webber, M., 1973, p. 163

[11] U.S. Department of Defense, JP 2-01.3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. U.S. Government Printing Office, 16 June 2009, p. I-1

[12] Kelly, Justin and Mike Brennan, "Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy," Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, (September 2009): p. 5.

support problem resolution. Only through tactical level understanding and execution can

progress achieve national defense, diplomacy and development.[13]

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[13] Clinton, Hillary, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Statement of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, Nominee for Secretary of State," 13 January 2009, p.7

CHAPTER II

OPERATION TRANSITION DEFINED

In the search for a definition of "transition," one would begin by looking to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.[1] In a review of this document, one would find that a military definition of transition does not exist. Transitions are abstractly defined in terms ranging from United States Agency for International Development (USAID) - Office of Transition Initiatives, to air intercept, to contingency planning, and to stability and peace operations.[2] Utilizing these definitions, a strategic, operational or tactical commander or planner is likely to have a different definition of transitions based on his or her responsibilities or operation environment in comparison to other commanders or planners. The lack of a military definition of "transitions" within planning and operations, has lead to confusion over transitions and a reduced appreciation of their role in military planning and operations.

Doctrine's generalization of transitions has lead to multiple usages of the term. An example of this generalization is in Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* that states:

> Transition is critical to the overall planning process. It is an orderly turnover of a plan or order as it is passed to those tasked with execution of the operation. It provides information, direction, and guidance relative to the plan or order that will help to facilitate situational awareness. Additionally, it provides an understanding of the rationale for key decisions necessary to ensure there is a coherent shift from planning to execution. These factors coupled together are intended to maintain the intent of the [CONOPS], promote unity of effort and generate tempo. Successful transition ensures that those charged with executing an order have a full

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[1] U.S. Department of Defense, JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, U.S. Government Printing Office, Amended, 12 April 2009.
[2] DOD, JP 1-02, 2009, pps. 20, 119-130, 154, 414.

understanding of the plan. Regardless of the level of command, such a transition ensures that those who execute the order understand the commander's intent and CONOPS. Transition may be internal or external in the form of briefs or drills. Internally, transition occurs between future plans and future/ current operations. Externally, transition occurs between the commander and subordinate commands.[3]

JP 5-0 directly states that transitions are *critical* to the planning process and then goes on to addresses the functional transition of a plan to a subordinate commander for execution of an operation. This one paragraph highlights the ambiguity of doctrine towards transitions. Transitions can occur within an operation (Offense, Defense, Stability and Support Operations), as well as between the six-phase joint operation construct (shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil governance), or as a transition between units (ex. Transfer of Authority), or take place in conventional and unconventional warfare. Transitions can be conducted internally and externally, as it addresses staff functions, subordinate units and command and control responsibilities. All these transitions are functional while in support of a plan.

Transitions in the planning process occur within the six-phase planning construct (Shape, Deter, Seize the Initiative, Dominance, Stability and Enable Civil Governance) described in notional operational plan phases.[4] These are operation transitions and defined primarily in their position between joint operational phases of a contingency plan (CONPLAN) or operation plan (OPLAN). As functional transitions are important to tactical level operations and execution, operation transitions are important at the operation and strategic levels of operation, planning and execution.

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[3] U.S. Department of Defense, <u>JP 5-0. Joint Operation Planning</u>, U.S. Government Printing Office, (26 December 2006): p. IV-35.
[4] DOD, <u>JP 5-0, 2006</u>, p. IV-34.

All these transitions could be considered critical to the mission's success; however, the paragraph does not address differences in transitions. The joint publication goes on to say "Regardless of the level of command, such a transition ensures that those who execute the order understand the commander's intent and CONOPS."[5] Transitions are critical to the overall planning process, yet military doctrine has not prescribed a definition or value to them.

Tactical Definitions of Transitions

As discussed, there are multiple definitions of transitions at the tactical level. Transitions are pervasive and contradictory throughout the tactical level operations lexicon. All transitions are resource intensive across military service organizations and affect training, material, leadership, and personnel as units plan. Military leadership executes missions utilizing resources available at the time that they are required. Units and leaders usually rely on the standard resources provided by the service force provider and the unit Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E).[6] The TO&E provides resources and capabilities to meet the requirements of combat operations. Military operations continue after hostilities conclude in combat operations, yet the military force may not have the critical capabilities or resources to meet the new requirements supporting stability operations. The ability to forecast and execute transitions at the tactical level of operations are critical to the conduct and conclusion of operations.

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[5] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. III-50.

[6] TO&E is used through the Department of Defense to provide units standard personnel and equipment requirements to conduct military operations. The Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTO&E) is also used to provide personnel and equipment not resident in the resourcing of the TO&E.

Doctrine in the United States Military primarily refers to transitions in tactical offense, defense and stability operations. The aforementioned operations are described in terms of conventional or unconventional warfare. U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 3-90, Tactics states, *"A transition occurs when the commander makes the assessment that he must change his focus from one type of military operation to another."*[7] The FM further states that transitions may occur in the event of a complete victory, a reaching of a culmination point, a change of mission, or the result of a political decision. The manual then continues to utilize transition in light of offense, defense, stability and support operations. The tactical transition is a point where a unit must conduct a different set of tasks and requirements. Other tactical examples may include: screening operations, relief in place, and forward or rearward passage of lines. Tactical transitions address changes in operations and do not address the overall depth of the problems involved in complex operations.[8]

Tactical discussions about transitions focus on metrics, indicators, measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and/or measures of performance (MOPs) in joint doctrine.[9] Can subordinate units subjectively or objectively measure or verify tasks or trends for current or future transitions within the area of responsibility or a designated region or city? Subordinate commanders and planners may receive MOEs or MOPs from their higher headquarters to identify the completion of a task, requirement or identify a future

[7] U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-90. *Tactics,* U.S. Government Printing Office, (04 July 2001): p. 3-50.

[8] Rittel, H., and Webber, M., (1973), p.165

[9] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. III-27.

transition. [10] The metrics provided may or may not accurately reflect the situation or

measure the environment of subordinate commanders and their units. Subordinate

commanders and staffs then formulate unit specific criteria based off their higher

headquarters metrics as an attempt to answer mandated reporting requirements.

Commanders then drive information collection requirements to identify the completion of

criteria, assess the environment to determine a future transition.[11] These criteria can be

objective, but are usually subjective in their attempt to measure the status of MOEs and

MOPs. The criteria do not discern if they are the right objectives to resolve problems and

meet national end states. Metrics, indicators, and criteria are important as long as they

provide common understanding and accurately reflect the situation or environment.

Tactical transitions are functional and measured and lead to the conclusion of

military operations. Defined functional transitions support tactical level understanding

and execution. Tactical assessment of MOEs and MOPs can support the definition of

operation transitions. Tactical transitions are measurable, but require a common strategic

to tactical understanding that reflects the situation and the operating environment.

Strategic Implications of Ill-Defined Transitions

As stated in chapter one, transitions are confusing and undefined. Defining

transitions within strategic lexicon requires debate and discussion in order to frame one's

understanding and support of transitions toward a common goal. The failure to define

transitions early negatively affects the military or nation's strategic capability to meet its

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[10] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. III-27.
[11] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. III-3.

long-term required national end states or interests. Military operations are costly

ventures that can quickly overwhelm a nation's resources and erode civil support for

national intervention. The U.S. military is well versed in maintaining and conducting

operations utilizing available resources irrespective of the progress toward military or

national end states. Failure of combatant commanders and planners to identify transitions

will negatively influence national strategic interests and contribute to eroding political

and populace support.

Transitions defined by the National Command Authority (NCA) or United States

Government (USG) Agencies are alluded to in discussions, speeches and documents.

Documents that discuss transitions range from the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS

Relief to the Congressional Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.[12] USG Agencies do not

readily identify with the methods or products created within military planning in support

operations toward national end states. Plans must identify tasks, capabilities and

resources to facilitate USG Agency collaboration and integration. Combatant

commanders and planners assume risk if these tasks, requirements and resources are not

defined in the discussion and planning with USG Agencies. Operation transitions focus

and bind tasks', capabilities' and resources' availability and support throughout the

operation to its conclusion.

Due to the generalization of transitions, planners have often based planning on

tasks, missions and requirements during a phase rather than focusing resources and

requirements to execute operation transition in support of the next phase or end state.

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[12] U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate, Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2002,
Volume I–A of Volumes I–A AND I–B, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, (July 2003): pps.
23,79.

Tactical mission tasks within an operation are focused in their conduct within an operational phase. Commanders and planners use limiting factors in the creation of mission tasks and requirements as they apply to unit capabilities and resources. Some of these limiting factors include; unit or organizational integrity, command and control relationships, TO&E shortfalls, etc. Phase requirements, tasks, and missions developed require funding and service training to facilitate their completion and yet may not meet the military or national end states of an operation.

Joint doctrine attempts to bridge the gap by utilizing the Logical Lines of Operation (LOOs) set along commanders decision points within the six-phase planning construct in support of military and national strategic objectives (end states). [13] Despite being set along the six-phase planning construct, operation transitions are not defined. Decision points and events provide the impetus for progress. The level of detail in a LOO is dependent on the amount time discussing and developing commander's decision points that may lead to national end states. LOOs focus on the application of all available capabilities to meet the commander's decision points. A limiting factor in the discussion of LOOs, is the planners ability to correctly identify decisions points that lead to national end states. The commander's ability to make or influence decisions outside military or security lines of operation is reduced. According to the doctrinal LOO construct, national resources and service support requirements are not addressed or forecasted in support of the commander's decision points. Despite the combatant command planners mental rigor

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[13] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. IV-22.

of developing LOOs, according to doctrine they do not define the transitions within a operation.

The author's definition of operation transitions would support a coherent course of action in which to provide the nation's resources against its end states. Combatant commanders and planners are required to develop feasible, suitable and viable plans to apply the nation's military resources in support of national end states. Utilizing the six-phase planning construct, operation transitions provide logical planning and resourcing junctures between operational phases. Operation transitions align military and national resources in support of a plan. Operation transitions also support assessment and review of a plans progress in order to confirm its alignment toward national end states.

**Operation Transitions Introduction**

Figure 1: Transition Definition

Defining operation transitions is critical to the understanding and conduct of conventional and unconventional warfare. As defined by the author earlier, *An **operation transition** is the movement, development, or evolution from one distinct operational*

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phase to a subsequent operational phase. Under the six-phase planning construct, operation transitions exist within and conform to current joint operation planning doctrine.

Figure 1 is the author's abstract representation of transitions, objectives, criteria, and end states within a six-phase planning construct. Decision points (DPs), measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and performance (MOPs) are discussed in military doctrine and will retain their task and purpose in planning.[14] [15] National and military end states are strategic end states that identify favorable conditions for the conclusion of direct intervention in a region. An *Intermediate Military Objective* (IMO) is an objective that requires national resource support to meet military or national end states. IMOs are goals for military actions set along operation transitions.

Functional transitions are transitions that occur within an operational phase to facilitate actions under a tactical commander's purview (offense, defense, stability and support operations). Its focus is on the tactical commander's role, authority and responsibilities during military operations to achieve the IMOs. These transitions are associated with offense, defense, stability and support operations, as well as tasks that fall under the scope of tactics, techniques and procedures such as, screening operations, forward and rearward passage of lines, relief in place operations and other operations.

Again, operation transitions are the movement, development, or evolution from one distinct operational phase to a subsequent operational phase. As discussed and created early in the planning process they provide the combatant commander and planner

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[14] U.S. Department of Defense, 2008, <u>JP 3-0. Joint Operations</u>, U.S. Government Printing Office, 17 Sep 2006, Change 1, (13 February 2008): p. III-11.
[15] DOD. JP 3-0, 2008, p. IV-31-32.

the ability to understand the problems, build recommendations, define solutions within a plan.   In addition, problem solution discussion allows for the initial identification of IMOs along operation transitions supporting military and national end states. Operation transitions facilitate the discussion of these requirements and concerns with the interagency, international organizations and non-government organizations without a developed course of action and the use of classified information. Operation transitions provide framing and confirmation of the problems, assertion of facts, reduction of assumptions, and the discussions of resources and capabilities and reduce risk in order to focus the mission requirements to identify viable end states.


Figure 2: Operation Transition Detail

The author's graphic above, Operation Transition Detail (Figure 2), is a representation of forecasting of resources and service capabilities along operation transitions. Operation transitions are critical to the overall planning process as they forecast and set resources and service support requirements to facilitate IMOs. It is a proactive approach in establishing resources for an operation transition to support forecasted IMO requirements to facilitate tactical unit implementation. An operation transition can forecast tasks and support for political, economic, social and infrastructure

efforts for all USG Agencies across the spectrum of operations.[16] These forecasted tasks

and support for political, economic, social and infrastructure requirements can also

provide the framework to support military conduct of these tasks and requirements.

Operation transitions require that the COCOM forecast national resources and service

provider requirements to sustain military and diplomatic efforts within a OPLAN or

CONPLAN. At this point, a combatant Commander is able to state general resources and

assets required to the president or the SECDEF in order to conduct full spectrum

operations for conventional and stability operations within a given region.

Transitions are critical as they inform a commander's decision and focus

resources, yet they are undefined with the current doctrine of the United States Armed

Forces. Tactical transitions are functional transitions that provide a structure and support

to operations within a given phase of operation. Strategic transitions are planning

oriented transitions that facilitate problem solving, supporting resources and identifying

coherent suggestions and a course of action to solving the problem. Operation transitions

support the initial estimate of requirements, resources and capabilities. The utilization of

operation transitions supports a collaborative, synchronized and integrated forecast of

resources and capabilities in support of a plan and the execution of military operations,

thereby filling an important gap in the doctrinal support to strategic, operational, and

tactical levels of command.[17]

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[16] U.S. Department of Defense, JP 2-01.3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, U.S. Government Printing Office, (16 June 2009): p. I-1.

[17] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. IV-29.

CHAPTER III

HOLES IN THE OPERATIONAL PLAN

Relevance of Transitions History

Carl von Clausewitz stated that, "War is thus an act to compel our enemy to do our will."[1] He further states, "that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means."[2] The transition from political to the military instrument is an engagement of a nation in policy. Gen. George Casey states that with increasing populations and communication, governments may increasingly find themselves in a period of persistent conflict over resources and ideologies.[3] This point is important as operation transitions occur within pre-hostilities, conflict (conventional warfare) to post-hostilities (stability operations) all of which require different resources in their execution.[4] Operation transitions demand increased attention as the USG can expect increased engagement in all periods of persistent conflict.

Key in this type of discussion is the increased optempo of nations, organizations and groups during persistent conflict.[5] Increasing numbers of conflicts affect the commanders and planners capabilities to plan, train and forecast requirements proactively for future conflicts. As a guide, conflicts can be viewed as political, military, economic

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[1] Clausewitz, Carl von, <u>On War</u>, Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, CH 1. p. 83.

[2] Clausewitz, Carl von, 1984, CH 1. p. 99.

[3] Garamone, Jim, 2007, p. 1

[4] U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-07, Stability Operations, U.S. Government Printing Office, 6 October 2008.

[5] Garamone, Jim, 2007, p. 1

and social at their most basic levels.[6] Thus, conflict is always occurring and affects all

governments of the world. The USG tasks the Department of Defense (DOD) to plan for

and conduct *conventional warfare* in order to defend or forcibly compel an individual,

group, government or nation to meet our nation's vital interests. The USG utilizes all

relevant agencies in the support of pre-conflict operations in order to influence and/or

sustain a stable political environment to influence nations that are amenable to the goals

of the USG and the population of the United States.

Carl Von Clausewitz and Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini understood the

implications of war as both men served national leaders, Prince August of Prussia and

Napoleon I of France respectively, that were also military commanders. Military and

political leaders must be sensitive to the inherit dangers that Clauswitz and Jomini

referred to as wars of reason, opinion and chance with all their associated danger. [7, 8]

Understanding the difference between a war of reason, opinion or chance will determine

different tactics, capabilities and resources in their conduct. Furthermore, the ability of a

nation to transition quickly from war to peace becomes increasingly important in

retaining its military and national resources in the conduct of war while maintaining the

support of the population.

In the current environment, a combatant commander and his planners must

understand the nature of war and the policies and associated interests of the government.

For example, if a commander is engaged in counter-insurgency, it becomes increasingly

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[6] DOD, JP 2-01.3, 2009, CH. I-1.
[7] Clausewitz, Carl von, 1984, p. 216.
[8] Jomini, Antoine Henri, The Art of War, London: *Greenhill Books*, 1992, p. 25.

important to employ all instruments of national power to stabilize the nation's population and government while attempting to isolate and mitigate the influence of insurgents. In most cases, military forces are the enabler for other decisive non-military activities that require transitions. A clear understanding of the U.S. Government policies and interests and its information and intelligence requirements can mitigate risks through the usage of clearly defined operation transitions.

Lastly, Clausewitz and Jomini may differ on the finer points of military genius, but both agreed that the capability of a commander to synthesize and evaluate the political requirements in conflict is key to victory.[9, 10] From their respective historical perspectives, national support and resources to conduct wars of reason, opinion and chance are derived from a monarch or a single ruler. The ability to tie the nation's policies, interests, capabilities and resources to a field commander may have been defined in discussion and subsequent plan between a leader and his commander. Under a democracy, the ability of a combatant commander or planner to gain clarity and understanding regarding a given policy toward a foreign government has become increasingly difficult. The combatant commander's ability to synchronize policy and gain resources is a deliberation between the SECDEF, the president, the nationally elected representatives and senators, and the supporting USG Agencies.[11] The clarification of operation transitions provides a common point of discussion reference

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[9] Clausewitz, Carl von, 1984, pps. 115-131.

[10] Jomini, Antoine Henri, 1992, p. 52-54.

[11] U.S. Department of Defense, CJCSM 3122.01 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies And Procedures), U.S. Government Printing Office, 14 July 2000, pps. C-3 thru C-6.

support actions within an OPLAN, focused toward policies, goals, capabilities and resources.

Building of a Capable Military Force

Vietnam, may have provided the impetus for the return to conventional warfare planning by the United States Armed Forces.[12] After the Vietnam War, the military was required to build an all-volunteer force to defend the United States of America.[13] The United States Armed Forces were required to develop new ways of integrating and training civilian volunteers into soldiers and officers while professionalizing the services.[14] Conventional warfare tasks, conditions and standards focused on the training of combat maneuver and fires.[15] Training manuals and doctrine focused on individual, squad, platoon, and company level operations, employment and evaluations.[16] Combat Training Centers (CTC) were created, developed and focused on Reception, Staging, Onward-movement & Integration (RSO&I), movement to the battlefield, and the conduct of conventional warfare.[17] During the years following Vietnam, the military focused on use of conventional warfare to protect or reestablish peace and security, as it was not going to be involved or entangled in peace or stability operations.

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[12] Gole, Henry G., General William E. DePuy: Preparing the Army for Modern War (American Warriors), 1 ed., Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2008.

[13] Stewart, Richard W., American Military History, Volume II, The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2003, Center of Military History, Pub 30–22, United States Army, Washington, D.C. 2005, pps. 370-375.

[14] Gole, Henry G., 2008.

[15] Stewart, Richard W., 2005, pps. 370-375.

[16] Stewart, Richard W., 2005, p. 390.

[17] Stewart, Richard W., 2005, p. 391.

To date, the United States Armed Forces and its coalition partners have been able to deter, seize the initiative and dominate in ground, air and sea combat and then quickly transition to stability operations.[18] The demands of national conflict and engagement have leveraged and utilized the military services in the conduct of war and stability operations (peacekeeping, peace enforcement, foreign internal defense, and counter insurgency operations).

Stability operations such as those listed above are not new, just newly understood and realized in their requirements and support to mitigate wars of opinions and politics.[19] Too quickly, U.S. forces have discovered that the resources, manning, coordination, and intelligence integration and requirements for stability operations exceed their current capability provided under the table of organization and equipment (TO&E).[20] Units, leaders, and soldiers are often well prepared and structured to support the traditional combat operational phases such as deterrence activities, seizure of the initiative, and dominance, but less so for operation transitions that support stability and enablement of governance. Stability operations are complex operations focused on the support of a population with ill-defined social problems and concerns. [21, 22]

Why do commanders and planners who are capable of thinking and adjusting to a problem, continue to struggle with these issues in a post hostilities environment? An example is Gen. David H. Petraeus, current commander of U.S. Central Command, who

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[18] U.S. Army, FM 3-07, 2008, p. 1-14.

[19] Jomini, Antoine Henri, 1992, p. 27.

[20] DOD, JP 1-02, TO&E Definition, p. A-99.

[21] U.S. Army, FM 3-07, 2008, p. 1-4.

[22] Rittel, H., and Webber, M., (1973). p. 166.

had to establish a new strategy during the conduct of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.[23] The answer to this question is key to achieving a holistic approach and outlook of the operation and includes the following points. Stability operations are dynamic in their comprehension, execution, effects and impacts. Such conditions reside both within and outside the military end states within an approved plan. A different and specific set of capabilities may be required beyond those provided by a general-purpose force or unit.

Operation transitions provide a structure beyond military end states to the discussion, determination and fulfillment of national end states. Operation transitions are an attempt to define the internal and external political and social problems early, in order to identify reasonable or logical ways ahead by determining and utilizing military and national end states. The logical path is supported by IMOs and national resources tied to a plan. Planning along operation transitions focuses on military and non-military tasks, requirements and resources to enable military engagement during post-conflict operations. A critical review of identified problems along with a forecasted plan to address a conflict provides information and insight to the greater physical and social problems that exist within a given region. This insight and knowledge along operation transitions drives understanding of the requirements (information, material resources, personnel, etc.) and the associated tactical tasks and strategic effects and implications of a CONPLAN or OPLAN.

Operation transitions may redefine the command requirements, resource requirements and the support relationships in order to sustain the plan. Commanders and

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[23] Petraeus, David H., U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, "Statement of LTG David H. Petraeus, Nominee for Commander, U.S. Forces of Iraq," 23 January 2007.

leaders have limited experience and exposure to these relationships and activities in training and exercises throughout their careers. They are normally observed as training mission "resets" where units switch from offense to defense, functional transition, during an exercise in the field. These transitions stress planning and functional transitions to facilitate continued combat operations.

When a plan is executed, commanders and planners at the strategic and operational levels find themselves in debates surrounding measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs) and subjective and objective metrics in a post hostilities environment.[24] IMOs provide focus toward tactical tasks and assessments to support the resolution of national (political, social, and military) end states along operation transitions. IMOs focus resources and plans to determine how national (political and social) end states are identified, planned for and resourced by the USG. The operation transition between phases is not forecasted or identified within the plan, and therefore the resources and planned IMOs in support of MOEs and MOPs or event triggers are ill defined and unable to foretell an operation transition.[25] Conventional warfare has a defined end state, and that is when the enemy no longer possesses the capability or the will to fight in an organized manner under control of a government or it capitulates under duress.[26] Units and forces are resourced and trained to meet this objective. Stability operations are usually based on internal and external factors (military, political, social and economic subjective and objective conditions) within a given objective and tied

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[24] Cordesman, Anthony, "Analyzing the Afghan War: Afghanistan and Measures of Effectiveness," Center for Strategic & International Studies, 28 July 2008, pps. 1-2.

[25] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. III-59.

[26] DOD, JP 3-0, 2008, pps. IV-7&8.

loosely to ill-defined transition points along operation transitions.[27] Units are not fully

resourced, organized or trained to meet post-hostilities tasks and requirements. As those

unit resource requirement assumptions would be forecasted and facilitated through the

initiation of OPLAN through all phases of military operations as defined in Joint

Publication 5.0 – Joint Operational Planning and JOPP. [28]

Understanding the importance of an operation transition is not ground breaking.

Development of operation transitions prior to planning provides an early understanding

of the known and existing problems within an environment, along with differences and

solutions to complex operations. Clearly defined operation transitions offer the

opportunity to develop assumptions quickly. Identifying the requirements for training

and resources early facilitates a better understanding of the tasks and requirements to

solve problems. The development of solutions to meet military and national end states

increases the likelihood of meeting the requirements to achieve conflict resolution and

mission success. Operation transitions provide emphasis on understanding assumptions,

possible risks, and the creation of IMOs in support of military and national end states

within a given OPLAN or CONPLAN. [29] IMOs in conjunction with MOEs, MOPs and

commander's decision points support the combatant commander's decision points for

operation transition. Operation transitions also focus on ensuring that tactical and

operational commanders have the required information and resources prior to the

execution of a new operational phase. Forecasted operation transitions enable the DOD

[27] U.S. Army, FM 3-07, 2008, p. I-10.
[28] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. IV-35.
[29] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, pps. I-4&5.

service's training requirements to support the combatant commander's identified and required operations capabilities necessary to the OPLAN or CONPLAN.[30]

Building the Strategic Plan and Using Operation Transitions

Current United States Joint and Military Service specific doctrine does not adequately project and address the planning requirements and resources to the levels requisite within a combatant Commander's CONPLAN or OPLAN. Combatant Commanders or planners after recognizing a threat to national end states exists or in receipt of national guidance focus their limited planning and intelligence capabilities toward the development of a CONPLAN or OPLAN. Joint doctrine prescribes the utilization of the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) to facilitate information gathering, mission analysis, a course of action development to understand military end states in support of national end states. [31] JOPP itself is a process designed to assist planners develop information required by the combatant commander, build a feasible, viable and suitable plan and gain concurrence from NCA.

Although JOPP provides a detailed process of building a plan there are three shortfalls where operation transitions would help in the development of CONPLANS and OPLANS. The first shortfall is in gaps between strategic guidance, military end states, and national end states. The second is in strategic guidance in the building and refinement of a comprehensive strategic plan supporting national end states. The last

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[30] U.S. Department of Defense, 2008, <u>CJCS Instruction: Joint Training Policy and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States</u>, U.S. Government Printing Office, May 31,
[31] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. III-1.

shortfall is the translation of strategic planning requirements to national resources and tactical tasks for execution.

The combatant commander receives strategic guidance within the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the Global Employment of the Force (GEF) for the planning of military resources to support national end states.[32] The JSCP is written under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to provide strategic guidance to drive contingency planning.[33] The CJCS also releases the GEF planning estimates to support force availability toward a CONPLAN or OPLAN.[34] These documents can be based off presidential speeches, the National Security Strategy (NSS) released by the NCA, National Defense Strategy (NDS) created by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the National Military Strategy (NMS) created by the CJCS, as well as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) conducted by OSD.[35] These documents and their corresponding guidance drive combatant Commanders and planners to the development and sustainment of military plans that support the NCA.[36] The development of these plans is focused on the creation of military end states that support national end states as informed by the NSS, NDS and NMS and operationalized by and among other documents and decisions, the JSCP and GEF.

CONPLANs built by the COCOM under national guidance are briefed from development to completion to the CJCS and the SECDEF through a series of interim plan

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[32] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. III-19.

[33] U.S. Department of Defense, CJCSI 3100.01B Joint Strategic Planning System, U.S. Government Printing Office, 12 December 2008.

[34] DOD, CJCSI 3100.01B, 2008, p. A-8.

[35] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, pps. GL-17&18.

[36] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. I-15.

reviews (IPRs).[37] These military plans include the creation of tasks and resources and training requirements for military services or USG Agencies. During the development of these tasks and requirements, USG Agency members stationed with the COCOM assist in the development of a CONPLAN. Tasks and requirements focused toward USG Agencies are recommendations, as USG Agencies may not receive knowledge of planning within a COCOM until directed by the SECDEF, National Security Advisor or President. Once the CJCS and SECDEF approve the plan, it is staffed to other USG Agencies as required through the NSC.[38]

Military end states created by planners under a CONPLAN define resources and training requirements facilitating the achievement of national end states. These end states support the identification and assignment of specific military tasks and requirements to the services. Military end states address those actions that must be achieved by the military to set the conditions for future post-hostility operations. A CONPLAN should reflect military tasks, resources and training requirements beyond military end states that are linked to national end states. This is a strategic process defined though strategic guidance provided by the SECDEF or CJCS. It drives a strategic plan developed by a combatant Commander for the leadership of the DOD.

The strategic plan is staffed as appropriate with subordinate commands only as required, once approved by the SECDEF, or upon activation of the plan by the NCA. USG Agencies may not be aware of a CONPLAN and its tasks, resources and training requirements due to the agencies lack of engagement or inclusion in the planning process

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[37] Klein, Robert M., Adaptive Planning, Not Your Great Grandfather's Schlieffen Plan, Joint Forces Quarterly 45, (2nd QTR 2009): pps. 84-88.
[38] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. II-1.

or sensitivity of the information surrounding the operation. The strategic guidance and national end states may drive planning for military end states under a CONPLAN, but it does not define the resources, tasks and requirements between military and national end states.

*Operation Strategic Guidance and Engagement Representation*

Figure 3: Military and Political Engagement Representation

The shortfall exists between the training and resources of the military services and the USG Agencies in support of post-hostility operations. This shortfall is represented in Figure 3 in the area labeled as "Military and Political Engagement." The United States Army and Marine Corps have developed doctrine that describes this transition between conflict and normalization of relations in stability operations.[39] [40] The United States military has experience in these operations in almost every war and action fought from our own Revolutionary War, Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War II,

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[39] U.S. Army, 2008, FM 3-07, 2008.

[40] United States Marine Corps, 1987, Small Wars Manual, Washington, D.C.: *Government Printing Office*.

Vietnam and others.[41] The Army Field Manual (FM) 3.07 Stability Operations is the

primary document that explains this transitional period between conflict and peace

providing 20 pages of guidance to essential tasks in Stability Operations.[42] The

Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3000.05 Stability Operations goes even

further and states "Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department

of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations."[43]

What is not addressed in the strategic guidance is the decisive and supporting efforts

in regards to planning for, oversight and resourcing of all USG Agencies in support of post-

hostilities operations. The conduct of war is relatively structured and organized in

comparison to the complex operations involved in supporting the reconstruction and

stabilization of a foreign government, military and population. The DOD is organized and

resourced to train and conduct warfare; however, the USG Agencies are not despite their

relevance in the closure of an operation. According to the DOD, the military is now

responsible for planning and support of operations to meet the requirements of national end

states when other USG Agencies are unable to support post-hostility operations.[44] The U.S.

State Department also has an Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and may have a

differing opinion as to the conduct and implementation of national end states within a given

region or state.[45]

In review of the strategic guidance, along with military and national end states, a

disconnect exists between strategic planning requirements and tactical resources and

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[41] U.S. Army, 2008, FM 3-07, 2008, pps. vi-vii.

[42] U.S. Army, FM 3-07, 2008, Chapter. 3.

[43] U.S. Department of Defense Instruction, 2009, DODI 3000.05, Stability Operations, September 16, p.1

[44] DODI 3000.05, 2009. p. 2

[45] Schnaubelt, Christopher M., "Complex Operations and Interagency Operational Art," Center for Complex Operations, *PRISM* Vol. I, No. 1, (December 2009): pps. 37-50.

execution. Planners develop training and resource requirements that are compiled and submitted within an individual CONPLAN.[46] The CJCS, throught the Joint Forces Commander and staff, is responsible for budgeting and determining allocation of resources to fulfill the training support requirements of the services scheduled to implement a CONPLAN.[47] Service budgets would then receive funding and develop requirements for tactical level units to train to a Deployment Mission Essential Task Listing (DMETL) along with their Core Mission Essential Task Listing (CMETL) in order to accomplish the requirements of the CONPLAN.[48]

The complexity of the paragraph above is magnified in the requirements, resources and capabilities of any given unit to meet the requirements listed by the COCOM in their CONPLAN or OPLAN. First, the armed services (Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, and Reserves) are responsible for training and equipping interoperable forces for assignment to Unified and Specified Commands.[49] Second, the training and resourcing applies to *all* military units, as they *all* rotate through CJCS requirement in the GEF identified to support and resource COCOM requirements while deploying to meet national military contingencies abroad. If each COCOM is estimated to have at least five CONPLANS, there are at least 35 different training and resourcing statements and requirements to be filled by the services. Ongoing military operations in Iraq or Afghanistan have allocated less than a year for a unit to focus their training requirements to meet their

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[46] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. GL-8.

[47] U.S. Department of Defense, <u>CJCSI 5123.01B Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council</u>, U.S. Government Printing Office, 15 April 2004.

[48] U.S. Army, 2008, FM 3-07, 2008, p. 3-21.

[49] U.S. Department of Defense, <u>CJCSI 3500.01B</u> <u>Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States</u>, U.S. Government Printing Office, 31 December 1999, pps. D-6&7.

next deployment horizon. Yet, DOD has stated that units are to be as proficient at stability operations as they are to combat operations.[50] Tactical and operational level units do not have the time, resources, capability, organization or budget to meet the current requirements leveled against them.

Lastly, military or national end states (strategic objectives) do not readily identify and translate into a tactical course of action (military or political) to achieve acceptable end states. National end states do not translate into commonly understood, agreed upon, tangible and achievable tactical level tasks by all military service components or all USG Agencies. DOD service organizations primarily focus on the conduct and training for conventional warfare and expend limited effort, time, resources and training toward the conduct of stability operations. Military officers, senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and units are generally familiar with the terms and general conduct of stability operations, but are seldom resourced, trained, exercised and rehearsed in these types of operations.   Tactical level implementers (military or civilian) are not trained to identify and develop tactical to strategic tasks relevant to national end states on the complexity of stability operations. Despite the military's lack of staffing, resourcing and training requirements to conduct stability operations, its civilian leadership continues to believe that DOD can achieve military and national end states. The implications of all the statements above are further impacted when it is *assumed* that the USG Agencies are able to provide comprehensive planning, support and lead to follow on requirements in a post-conflict environment. Both the DOD and other USG Agencies have similar problems planning, supporting and leading to follow on requirements in a post-conflict

[50] DODI 3000.05, 2009, p. 1.

environment. The lack of resources outside of the DOD has led the government to

identify alternative funding practices such as the Commander's Emergency Response

Program (CERP) and the current Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding to

support post-conflict operations. Operation transition implementation and considerations

can be a important way to integrate strategic guidance and resources to tactical

organizations, tasks, training and capabilities.

CHAPTER IV

DEFINING THE OPERATION TRANSITIONS

Operational Objectives, Transitions, and End States


Figure 4: Notional Operation Plan Phases[1]

Operation transitions are the spaces in between phases of an operation plan (OPLAN) or contingency plan (CONPLAN). These operational transitions are reflected in current doctrine as lines showing the breaks between phases as demonstrated in Figure 4, Notional Operation Plan Phases.[2] The construct above does not reflect the complexity or the requirements of an operation transition. It merely states that a commander (tactical, operational or even strategic) assesses when operations have changed focus toward a different phase's tasks and requirements. An example may be, Operations Iraqi

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[1] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. IV-34.
[2] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. IV-34.

Freedom and Enduring Freedom, which have never officially transferred from Phases III to Phase IV of the OPLAN despite the conduct of stability operations by the United States Armed Forces within these two theaters of operation. The official transition from Phase III to IV operations is not nearly as important as understanding the tasks, requirements and resources to continue forward momentum toward a closure of military operations.

A majority of a planning staff's time is spent developing the operations within a phase to facilitate the deployment and support to the first three phases of the operation. [3] This is based on time available to plan and the leveraged requirements of the command. The Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) demands time and vigilance in the verification of force flow to fulfill the requirements of a CONPLAN or OPLAN. These are real and demanding requirements that influence the planning staff time and viabilitiy of a COA within a CONPLAN or OPLAN. In the initial phase of the operation information supporting the deployment of forces and the conduct of conventional warfare is paramount to the preparation, execution and success of an OPLAN. However, any failure to address the preparation and conduct of post-hostilities activities toward end states set the conditions for protracted stability operations.

Figure 4 above lead to an understanding that the plan must have equality in planning for all phases of an operation. [4] Operational phases IV and V include military engagement until a capable organization or USG Agency is able to conduct operations

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[3] DOD, JP 3-0, 2008, p. II.
[4] DOD, JP 3-0, 2008, p.. II.

without the support of military force. The graphic implies that parity in the planning and conclusion of operations is of equal importance to the deployment of forces in pre-hostilities, conflict or post-hostilities.

What the figure above does not provide is a sense of time. Emphasis in the graphic is focused on dominate activities, while history has shown that state on state conflict has often been completed in 180 days to two years; however, stabilize and enable governance has often lasted more than ten years. Recent operations that reflect this are Iraq (Operation Northern Watch and Operation Iraqi Freedom - 1991), Haiti (Operation Uphold Democracy - 1994), Bosnia (Operation Joint Endeavor - 1995), Kosovo (Operation Joint Guardian - 1999) and soon Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom - 2001) which are all examples of long-term U.S. military engagement in post-hostilities fragile states.

Operation transitions are an attempt to provide a strategic to tactical structure and guidance to help understand the challenges of ill-structured problems faced within a complex operation.[5] Defined IMOs along the operation transitions provide tactical tasks in a framework that facilitates military and national end states approved by the NCA. OPLANs should be a reflection of the overall national security strategy and address the identified and agreed upon problems, as discussed earlier. The OPLAN should provide a structure with which national end states are tied to national resources and training requirements to undertake identified problems. Operation transitions assist, focus and forecast those national resources and costs required by tactical and operational

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[5] Horst W. J. Rittel, "On the Planning Crisis: Systems Analysis of the 'First and Second Generations'," *Bedriftsøkonomen* 8, (1972): 392-393.

commanders for the execution of an entire operation. A CONPLAN or OPLAN course

of action for an ill-structured set of problems supported by IMOs and decision points

should identify expected effects, resources. IMOs in support of military and national end

states along operation transitions facilitate the determination of mission success and may

lead to an earlier termination of military engagement. Operation transitions are also

important in telegraphing your intentions, actions and end states through strategic

communications.

Figure 5: Notional Operation Plan Transitions Redefined

Figure 5. Notional Operation Plan Transitions Redefined above illustrates the

relationships of IMO's, operation transitions, and resource requirements toward a

complex operation. It is important to note that within a given CONPLAN or OPLAN,

units within a specified operating environment (OE) can conduct tactical operations in

conjunction with different operational phases. These tactical tasks focus on completing

specific IMOs set along operation transitions. One tactical commander may be

conducting offensive operations against a stubborn enemy force (joint operational Phase

II, Seize the Initiative), while a second commander prepares to move into the OE (joint operational Phase I, Deter), while a third commander conducts stability operations within a region or city (joint operational Phase IV, Stabilize). Consequently, this reinforces the requirements for plans that defined and resourced IMOs for all phases from the start of an operation.

An OPLAN may provide the commander's intent, but the operation transitions within a plan are the anchor points to a combatant commander's alignment and understanding of requirements and resources of the subordinate commanders operating under his guidance. Operation transitions define strategic points where a combatant commander has a common understanding of the tasks associated with IMOs that may challenge subordinate commanders. Combatant commanders can then focus their attention and assist those commanders that are encountering turbulence achieving IMOs in support of the OPLANs. The tactical commander's availability of resources and understanding of the task requirements facilitate an operation transition through completion of IMOs within their area of responsibility while remaining focused on the military and national end states.

The critical operation transition occurs between Phase III: Dominate and Phase IV: Stabilize under joint doctrine.[6] This operation transition defines the military's operation transitions from conventional warfare to unconventional warfare in support of stability operations allowing for the security of the population and support of local governance. The operation transition between these two joint operational phases is a

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[6] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. I-17.

major shift in the conduct of military operations. The operational design elements of

simultaneity, depth, timing and tempo affect resources required by the tactical

commanders and their units to conduct operations.[7] The physical resources required by

tactical commanders dramatically increases as ill-structured problems within the

administration of politics, law, law enforcement, economics, social and infrastructure

within the OE.[8] Transfer of authority between incoming and outgoing tactical and

operational commanders and units may require different skill sets, organizational

structure and training to meet the requirements of the IMOs, along operation transitions

toward military and national end states.

Figure 6: Sample Logical Lines of Operations[9]

To date the military has addressed operation transitions only generally in our

planning documents and diagrams.[10] The joint doctrine diagram above addresses

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[7] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, pps. IV-24&25.

[8] DOD, JP 2-01.3, 2009, p. I-1.

[9] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. IV- 22.

operational phases as a line of continuity across the top representing progress through

decision points toward national strategic objectives. There are no specified or identified

operation transitions, the subjective arrangement of tasks that support the decisive points

are unknown. The effects that would possibility lead from these decision points to a

specific military end state may not assist in the national end states (national strategic

objectives) and interests. A coherent narrative must be commonly understood from

implementation to strategic oversight in order to address the myriad of problems that

exist in the complex operations of a post-hostilities (stability operations) environment.

Operation Transitions and Wicked, Ill-Structure Problems

Operation transitions are an attempt to provide a support structure to a complex

problem or operation, or in this case a combatant commander's OPLAN or CONPLAN.

Wicked problems are resident in all social and policy activities of a population. [11] They

are wicked and ill-structured because the changing properties and transitory nature of

problems which can result in positive or negative effects upon the result you are trying to

achieve.[12] Often there are no criteria to ending a problem, and each problem is unique to

the time, situation and events that surround them.[13] Even Clausewitz discusses the

uncertainty of human nature and the longing for clarity and certainty in war.[14] Problems

involving the engagement of society are numerous and indefinable in nature. Defining a

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[10] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. IV- 22.

[11] Rittel. Horst W. J., 1972, 392-393. Emphasized in the U.S. Department of the Army, TRADOC
Pamphlet 525-5-500, Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command, 28 January 2008, Chapter 1, pps. 8-9.

[12] Rittel, H., and Webber, M., 1973, p. 169.

[13] Rittel, H., and Webber, M., 1973, p. 163.

[14] Clausewitz, Carl von, 1984, p. 160.

problem "(knowing what distinguishes an observed condition from a desired condition)

and of locating (finding where in the complex causal networks the trouble truly lies)" are

the hardest parts.[15] Yet the USG will continue to call upon its agencies' capabilities and

resources to manage and provide solutions for these varying, wicked and ill-structured

problems.

Planners are charged, through the commander, with identifying problems,

applying structures with solutions to those problems (OPLAN or CONPLAN), and

assisting in the execution of an OPLAN to mitigate those problems. In order to facilitate

operation transitions, we have to understand and identify problems and solutions to those

problems. In the case of a COCOM, guidance can be provided through national

documents such as: the Joint Operating Environment (JOE); the Capstone Concept for

Joint Operations (CCJO); the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP); and, the Global

Employment of the Force (GEF).[16] These documents provide insight and guidance to a

generalized problem set, but not necessarily insight into the details of the problems,

possible acceptable solutions, or the short or long-term effects of those problems and

their affects upon national end states. As discussed earlier, each problem is unique and

therefore a considerable amount of energy is applied to ensuring that the correct problems

are addressed.

As discussed in the second chapter, current joint doctrine provides the Joint

Operational Planning Process (JOPP) as "an orderly, analytical planning process, which

consists of a set of logical steps to analyze a mission, develop, analyze, and compare

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[15] Rittel, H., and Webber, M., 1973, p. 159.

[16] U.S. Department of Defense, CJCSI 3100.01B Joint Strategic Planning System, U.S. Government
Printing Office, 12 December 2008, p. E-2.

alternative COAs, select the best COA, and produce a plan or order."[17] Joint doctrine

also provides the process of operational design.[18] Neither process discusses the

formation of problems prior to the development of tactical tasks, courses of action, IMOs,

effects or military end states. Some may state that problems are identified in the

processes above. The author contents that planners must initially determine the situation

from an unconstrained perspective to understand the nature of the problems that exist

within an OE. These are political and social problems that require actions to mitigate

their increased detriment to society or solutions to influence or fix them.

Identifying the problem is not a new idea. Identifying the problem has roots in

Charles Kepner and Benjamin Tregoe's work, where they prescribe situational, problem,

and decision analysis prior to the development of the problem in 1965.[19] Horst Rittel

subsequently discusses social and policy problems as wicked and unstructured.[20] Both

works have been used and cited to facilitate the solving of problems through the writing

of the Army's 2008 *Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design*.[21]

The identification of the problem has been discussed recently within joint

doctrine; however, it is not new to the Army. The Army developed and published the

Staff Organizations and Operations Field Manual in 1997. Under this doctrine, Appendix

D discusses staff studies and decision papers, where planners are to identify and state the

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[17] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. III-1.

[18] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. VI-1.

[19] Kepner, Charles Higgins, and Benjamin B. Tregoe, "The Rational Manager: A Systematic Approach to Problem Solving and Decision-Making," New York: McGraw-Hill. 1965.

[20] Rittel, H., and Webber, M., 1973, p. 167.

[21] U.S. Army, TRADOC Pam 525-5-500, pps. 8-9.

problem.[22] We have migrated away from problem identification and understanding over the past ten years to emphasis planning for end states, mission, objectives, effects, tasks and courses of action that may not even address the problems facing a planner. Planners must understand and identify the problems and facilitate the identification of solutions toward military end states that achieve national end states and policy. Planners are then able to create and develop training in support of tactical task that facilitate IMOs to focus resources along operation transitions.

For the purpose of further discussion, problem solutions can be aligned along the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) construct, in conjunction with LOOs.[23] In accordance with the JSCP or under the guidance of a combatant commander, planners should develop tactical tasks in support of LOOs that fulfill national end states. LOOs provide a construct to develop understanding of the problems affecting individuals, groups, parties, ethnicities, and nations within a defined region or nation state. [24, 25] Problems are prioritized against the national end states, interests and policies. Multiple problems exist within any given region or nation. The identification of solutions to prioritize end states support the development of relevant IMOs toward military end states that facilitate national end states (see figure 7. Logical Lines of Operation Refined below). Military end states within or along political and social centric LOOs may have equal importance regarding the timing and conduct of tactical tasks supporting end states. Military end states with support from IMOs and

[22] U.S. Department of the Army, 1997, FM 101-5, Staff Organizations and Operations, U.S. Government Printing Office, May 31.

[23] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p.. III-16.

[24] DOD, JP 2-01.3, 2009, p. I-1.

[25] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. IV-19.

operation transitions allow the strategic to tactical level commander to establish media

engagement (talking points, public engagement, soldiers) early to facilitate transparency

of his operations in support of strategic communications.

Figure 7: Logical Lines of Operations Refined

IMPORTANT: IMOs developed to facilitate military end states aligned with

operation transitions establish a strategic to tactical baseline of tactical training and task

requirements to meet operation transition to fulfill end states. IMOs require objective

data that allow for the mitigation of problems identified. Subjective and objective

measures of effectiveness should be developed to understand the positive or negative

effects of the operations conducted in support of the IMOs.

Economic corruption will be used as an example to address discovery and

requirements of supporting IMOs and military and national end states. Economic

corruption would be termed as a "wicked" problem by Mr. Rittel as it involves multiple

aspects of an individual's life and has effects across society.[26] This is a relatively quick

look a large problem and how one might use operation transitions to support planning.

Figure 8. Economic Corruption logical Lines of Operation shown below is a

graphic representation of the IMOs in support of military and national end states

supporting strategic communication.

Figure 8: Economic Corruption Logical Lines of Operation

The military end state is the establishment of banking services to allow for

individual and national practices in compliance with international banking practices. The

national end state above would align with the national security strategy of "A strong,

innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes

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[26] Rittel, H., and Webber, M., 1973. p. 159.

opportunity and prosperity." as stated by President Obama in May 2010.[27] IMOs

supporting the national end state may include: method of monetary disbursement

finalized; new currency available for disbursement; identification of bank locations;

electronic banking requirements assessed to name a few ideas. These items may have

measures of effectiveness that include: establishment of new banking laws for country X;

banking education material for local populace; or banking education of the local populace

complete. (This is not an inclusive list of operational objectives or measures of

effectiveness).

IMOs are tied to operation transitions and require national resourcing which

would be tracked and supported by the combatant commander and staff. Measures of

effectiveness provide insight into the actual effectiveness of the tactical tasks toward

achieving IMOs and military end states. Operation transitions allow for tactical to

strategic communication focused at local and national media (through talking points), and

identifying, demonstrating and telegraphing forward progress toward end states that

support an OPLAN.

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[27] Obama, Barack, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," U.S. Government
Printing Office, (27 May 2010), p.17.

CHAPTER V

CONSIDERATIONS FOR OPERATION TRANSITIONS

Planners Considerations

If it is important enough to plan for (expend critical resources), it is important to

have a relevant and passionate discussion as to its resolution. As discussed earlier, the

U.S. plans for external and internal ill-structured problems. Operation transitions provide

a framework for the implementation of a CONPLAN or OPLAN. Planning for them

synchronizes resources and coordinates both physical and information efforts. Operation

transitions identify the training, tasks and required resources. This is done in concert

with the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) regarding the ends, ways and means

of operational art.[1] The approach is meant to be proactive, not reactive, in its

implementation.

A combatant commander's time is limited. Their thoughts into "wicked" and ill-

structured problems are also limited.[2] Their continuous engagement with national

leadership is varied across a broad number of complex topics.[3] The topics effect daily

requirements within their area of responsibility. They also serves as liaisons to key

leaders within their operating environment. The demands and requirements of their

engagements and liaison are continuous. Combatant commanders need to be careful

about the amount of time they spend in minute detail. It is essential that commanders

stick with their priorities when managing their time.

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[1] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. IV-1.
[2] Rittel, H., and Webber, M., 1973, p. 164.
[3] U.S. Army, TRADOC Pam 525-5-500, p. 12.

Similar to combatant commanders, planners also have limited time available to discover and understand problems.[4] Concurrently, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) lists identifies problems that are currently effecting national interests.[5] These problems require planning to meet set timetables and requirements. COCOM planners must proactively search for information and resources. Planners must identify current problem sets and possible solutions across of instruments of national power prior to beginning the planning process. Planners are key to operational success and therefor need time to think.

A COCOM planners feel that it is beyond their military authority to think beyond military parameters. Non-military plans and engagement are circumspect by USG agencies. Upon receipt of an order, the DOD and its COCOMs are ultimately responsible for a given region.[6] Current DOD policy requires the military to plan for and address all aspects of military, political and social problems, if other USG agencies are unable to address them.[7] Failure to understand and develop plans that account for all identified conditions (political, social and economic) will increase the risk associated with the problems at hand. Experience shows that failure to plan for operations beyond a military scope unacceptably limits resources, requirements and capabilities that will be needed. Therefore, USG agencies, coalition partners, international and non-governmental organizations are unable to synchronize their efforts against an identified set of problems.

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[4] U.S. Army, TRADOC Pam 525-5-500, p. 11.
[5] 10 USC – Armed Forces § 164: Commanders of combatant commands: assignment; powers and duties.
[6] DODI 3000.05, 2009, p.13
[7] DODI 3000.05, 2009, p. 2

Current doctrine states that the combatant commander initiates planning upon receipt of guidance once the mission, objectives, and tasks are received from a higher command authority.[8] Combatant commander provide their initial intent, planning guidance, and commander's critical information requirements based off their experience, judgments and staff inputs. From this time forward, the a planner's time is constrained in the development of an OPLAN in preparation for execution. CONPLANs are different in that they are contingencies or in the event that circumstance change operations tied to allocated or apportioned forces. A CONPLAN or OPLAN should provide a comprehensive understanding of the problems, the capabilities, and requirements to mitigate them successfully. CONPLAN or OPLAN development demands that planners research beyond the military scope of the specified guidance of the commander.

The development of military and national end states require in-depth analysis and understanding of problems that influencing groups, governments or region. Planners need to encourage and challenge their intelligence structure, peers and subordinates to anticipate, identify and a precise definition of and analyze ill-structured problems within the OE. The discovery and precise definition of problems that threaten a region's stability and national interest is key in developing a manageable and measureable course of action. Although, the National Intelligence Community's capability to support intelligence requirements is extensive, their capability must be carefully focused to meet the COCOM's needs.[9]

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[8] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. III-3.

[9] Reagan, Ronald, Executive Order 12333 - United States Intelligence Activities, 04 December 1981, p. 6.

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Engaging intelligence planners early is essential to the accurate framing of operational problems. In so doing, follow up questions should be the norm. In addition, early engagement creates the opportunity for intelligence sharing and collection beyond the organic resources of any single organization or group. Typically, the intelligence community supplies intelligence that informs political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure considerations (PMESII).[10]

Certain considerations can help planners to focus their information requirements. Focus can be achieved through JIPOE requirements to gather key pieces of information to support their efforts. Specifically, planner's review of available intelligence directs them to other problems. Such discussions offer the opportunity to synthesize actions towards an affected group, structure, community, system or nation within the operating environment. This also helps in the construction of a region's mission analysis brief.[11] Subsequently the use of end states assist in a path of change, both relevant and measurable, which are interpreted into IMOs. It is important to note that these are tied to resources stationed along operation transitions. Also, adversary courses of action are not normally discussed in developing operation transitions; however, the understanding of the adversary's capabilities, resources, interests and potential actions are discussed and analyzed. Confirmed situational awareness and intelligence provides facts, reduces assumptions and mitigates risk prior to the conduct of mission analysis.

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[10] DOD, JP 2-01.3, 2009, p. I-1.
[11] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. III-51.

A planner's synthesis of solutions requires a full understanding of the problems

on hand.[12] <u>Focus</u> on the national end states requires a common visualization of the

solutions to each problem by the planners and the command. Once these solutions are

determined and approved they drive the creation of relevant and measurable IMOs. [13]

The arrangement of IMOs across operation transitions is accounted for along the joint

six-phase planning construct aligned with requirements and resources beyond the

organizations tasks to implement the IMOs.[14]

At this point the stage is set to address operation transitions. Operation transitions

are conducted prior to or in conjunction with JIPOE.[15] Operation transitions facilitate a

proactive approach in developing situational awareness, information gathering and an

estimate of the resources required to support a region's identified problems. The

identification of problems occurs prior to an order from higher.

The six-phase joint planning construct provides for a wide-angle view of the

problem sets from pre to post-hostilities. Operation transitions are a method to estimate

the cost and options of solving problems that influence the nation's end states. The

problem is tied to tasks, decision points, decisive points and requirements to resource the

completion of IMOs. The IMOs allow for increased understanding of the tactical tasks

that support objective necessities based along operation transitions. All aspects of an

operation require assets to be resourced and available to conduct action to mitigate or

influence problems within a given environment. If military forces are required to conduct

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[12] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. III-48.
[13] DOD, JP 3-0, 2008, p. IV-33.
[14] DOD, JP 3-0, 2008, p. IV -26.
[15] DOD, JP 2-01.3, 2009, p.I-1.

post-hostilities operations, forecasted training and resource requirements will need to be available to support the change in mission.   In the event that USG Agencies are able to support both pre and post combat operations the resources will have been forecasted and positioned to enable the completion of end states. Lastly, under CONPLAN or OPLAN review, USG Agency partners can influence, set the conditions, act upon and enable solutions during pre-hostilities operations. The estimates engaged in cost and resources may determine if a plan is feasible or may mitigate impediments.

The creation of IMOs along operation transitions in the six phase planning construct is not a wasted effort. Rather, IMOs supports the development of LOOs and decision points. Operation transitions applied to LOOs provide background information to the discussion and offer support of lines of effort. This construct allows for the creation of tactical tasks and strategic oversight requirements that facilitate understanding and completion of the plan. LOOs support a common vision of the operation to all involved, while operation transitions provide markers and comprehension of the current and future operational requirements. The six phase joint planning construct provides a consideration of the tasks and resources needed along the operation transitions and bring about the expansion of a baseline of facts, assumptions and risks.

The process works to identify interrelated problems that require the synchronization of IMOs. The six phase planning construct harmonizes all organization efforts, resources, training requirements in conjunction with the creation of a tactical to strategic requirements around operation transitions. Operation transitions provides a platform to discuss and gain further guidance from the combatant commander regarding

future internal resource allocation and external resource requests. Planning for operation

transitions aligns physical resources and costs in support of end states.


Figure 9: Transition Definition

The six phase joint planning construct allows a coherent narrative to lead the

discussion and review of problems within a given region or nation. In practice, this

discussion includes USG Agencies, coalition partners, and trusted host nation support* as

all have valid input to the solutions to complex problems.[16] The result of these

discussions is an early confirmation and agreement on the problems proceeding a

emergent CONPLAN or OPLAN. Activities and initiatives synchronization assists the

integration, forecasting and support across all participating organizations. The discussion

also provides a forum for new ideas that support the resolution of problems, and confirms

that a common plan has consensus and is implemented by all organizations. Lastly,

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[16] Rittel, H., and Webber, M., 1973, p. 164.
* Trusted Host Nation Support or Personnel, although a valuable member to the discussion and solution of the problem, may become a liability later in the process, as their interests may conflict with ours. Vetting and level of engagement should be carefully reviewed prior to discussion and use.

indicators can help to mitigate problems providing an alternate means that may even avoid conflict.

LOOs in conjunction with resource support, IMOs and operation transitions allows a broad outline to assist the political and social requirements of the later stages of the operation.[17] Normal cycles sustain Service training for the conduct of conventional warfare as they are part of the CMETL; whereas, stability operations are not stressed prior to the execution of an OPLAN as they are part of the DMETL.[18] The DMETL does not influence training requirements and resources until a unit is designated to support a given operation. Utilizing LOOs can focus requirement and forecast distribution and resourcing of organizations, personnel, and training for the Services throughout the operation.

Examples of developing and reorganizing force as observed by the author include; the utilization of U.S. Air Force Military Police in a partnership role with host nation national, regional and local police in support of stability operations.[19] The reorganization of U.S. Army light infantry companies into 16-man teams was intended to facilitate force protection, political engagement, economic revitalization, media support and infrastructure assessment teams. Additionally, the U.S. Army's now trains and utilizes of artillery and air defense soldiers as truck drivers and route security personnel. Lastly, the U.S. Marine and Navy personnel are employed support of Army brigade for support force

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[17] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. III-16.
[18] U.S. Army, FM 3-07, 2008, p. 3-21.
[19] Author's personal experience in Iraq, See Bibliography.

protection, intelligence and maintenance activities. All these actions have not occurred

based off the OPLAN, but reflect the necessity to support the operation.

Operation transitions provide an initial review of the training resources required

to execute the plan from an unconstrained perspective. It identifies and determines

resource requirements for everything from armored vehicles, to unmanned aerial

vehicles, intelligence capabilities, ships, aircraft, interagency support, governmental

support, non-governmental support, contracting, and acquisition to multiple other

resources. LOOs drive the discussion and creation of education requirements and

commonality in training beyond METL proficiency, such as farming; fisheries; law

enforcement; justice support; and local governance to support the initial requirements of

an occupied nation and populace. A standard of training that results from operational

provides need common knowledge in implementation guidance to national to all levels of

governance. LOOs also affect military organizational structures to sustain operational

changes in support of training guidance and IMO requirements. During mission analysis,

further refinement of identified resources to implement COCOM requirements are

presented to higher (CJCS or SECDEF) to develop funding in support of the operation.

LOOs and national end states provide the combatant commander the opportunity

to furnish guidance to subordinate commanders across a broad holistic perspective along

with requirements to meet IMOs. This affords the combatant commander the opportunity

to synchronize his subordinate unit commanders toward IMOs and operation transitions.

Subordinate commanders are then able to provide cogent feedback as to their current

situation and requirement shortfalls required to complete the IMOs. The LOOs and

operation transitions structure allows for subordinate units in different operational phases

to focus their resourced efforts toward the OPLAN IMOs. LOOs and operation

transitions present staffs the tactical to strategic picture while supporting and assessing

the current environment.

Problems discovery within an operating environment leads to the identification of

interrelated problems. This discovery allows the creation of new IMOs along operation

transitions that support end states. These IMOs may require sequential completion in

order to influence and support decisive points along multiple LOOs. If the IMO

requirements are not achieved, it may result in a branch plan or sequel in support of the

operation.[20] An example is the development of the national communications

infrastructure to increase the capacity of national governance and national and local

economic development. It should be noted that, social concerns and issues, related to

political, economic, military and infrastructure accumulate around, influence and impact

interrelated ill-structured problems. The employment of the operation transition

framework below proactively serves to mitigate associated problems.

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
[20] DOD, JP 5-0, 2006, p. III-20.

Figure 10: Logical Lines of Operations Refined

Synchronization and strategic communication of the IMO efforts, its effects, and goals are key in executing a CONPLAN or OPLAN. Strategic communications forecasted within the six-phase planning construct allows for the correlation and development of information and talking point prior to execution of IMOs with the OPLAN.[21] Communicating one's short and long-term messages has the capability to mitigate social unrest, uncertainty, and conflict during the conduct of forecasted tactical level operations. It also allows for the identification and creation of organizational structures along with the development of individual media training requirements. This must be done to support the effectiveness of releasing relevant information at all levels of the operation in support of IMOs.

Operation transitions within the six phase planning construct allow the combatant commander an early discussion and engagement with key decision makers set in facts, assumptions and risks. They provide an overview of the problems that affect the national end states. This allows the combatant commander knowledge of the forecasted information gaps and identified problems in the development and support of end states. IMOs facilitate discussion and requirements in the forecasting of operation transitions where the resources are required to facilitate the achievement end states. The combatant commander may then provide further direction to the process, and increase or decrease internal and external support to the problem, or recommend interagency coordination

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[21] Mullen, Michael G., "Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics," Joint Forces Quarterly 55, (4th QTR 2009): 2-4.

through the SECDEF to flush out the details surrounding the problems. As this is a proactive process, i.e. early in the planning process, a decision may not be required.

This framework for discussing operation transitions and problems of a region or nation among USG Agencies, coalition partners, and others may not occur until increased attention is given to the identified problems. However, this information baseline provides for the common understanding and discussion of the problems as identified. Operation transitions development allows for the discussion of activities or initiatives or forecasted capabilities within a region to support an operation. This allows for the discussion of other ideas and solutions for integration within the plan. Operation transition discussion may lead to understanding other ways to interdict identified problems, discover additional problems, and mitigates them prior to or during the execution of the plan.

Full Spectrum Operations will be required of the United States Armed Forces in the short and long-term future, but at the COCOM level, planners need to develop plans that proactively search for processes that head off the use of military force. This six phase planning construct runs counter to Service culture as it focuses planning toward non-military (political, social and economic) related problems and solutions. The future is likely to see an increase in the engagement of the United States in persistent conflicts beyond the capabilities of the force under its current requirements.[22] Therefore, planners need to become increasingly proactive in their pursuit of problems and conditions in their operating environment.

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[22] Gates, Robert M., Quadrennial Defense Review 2010, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1 February 2010.

Figure 11: Military and Political Engagement Representation

Operation transitions are an essential framework in support of national end states. The ability to plan, forecast and execute operation transitions is essential to achieving national end states in a timely matter. In defining the problem and identifying intermediate military objective aligned with operation transitions, estimated resources and costs can be forecasted and set in support of tactical units prior to the execution of the mission. Operation transitions can provide a common strategic to tactical understanding of the requirements in support of a holistic operations in light of perceived national risk. Operation transitions and associated intermediate military objectives support the tactical task navigation through the joint phases to support an operation plan. Therefore it is the authors view that operation transitions are essential for addressing tactical tasks with strategic resources in support of national end states.

Considerations and Concerns for the Future

Looking toward the future the USG is likely to commit physical resources to conditions that will require a holistic review. The utilization of operation transitions from the early stages of planning provides an initial estimate of resources and cost of an action. The USG, partner nation, or international organization with all the problems identified, the cost of the resources toward the objectives along operation transitions may likely discover that the cost is more than the nation or coalition economies can economically or politically support.

In order to resolve and mitigate problems that may involve the use of force, an open conversation must occur among combatant commanders and planners, USG agency members, coalition partners and interested groups. They need to develop a greater understanding of the military, political and social problems that threaten the stability of an identified population and region. These problems need to be identified and discussed early in the process to increase the possibility of alternative solutions to protect the full spectrum of interests prior to military intervention. If military invention is required, the USG must confirm and define all end states, IMOs and national resources required. In so doing, decisions must be made early along a variety of matters including operation transitions. Do to the nature of such decisions the whole of government needs to be included. In so doing the use of operation transitions become a viable endeavor. This involves the OPLAN or CONPLAN. Clearly, these documents needs to provide strategic to tactical coordination and synchronizations that is critically important in complex operations. In addition to a plan, tactical to strategic assessments should be developed to support a holistic assessment and critique. An OPLAN or CONPLAN must integrate,

correlate and synchronize strategic to tactical level communication toward targeted populations and assess the success of the message. It is also reasonable to assume that the military will assume a greater role in the initial assembly and support to social and political institutions during post-hostility stability operations.

Recent U.S. history has emphasized the need to implement military planning for military intervention and end states falls short of achieving national end states as military end states do not address political or social problems. Few military planners have the knowledge to synthesis solutions to political and social problems to complete operations. Military doctrine states that the military supports post-hostility and stability operations, but the military has focused on the execution of conventional warfare due to constraints of resources and time. While military structure, personnel, training and support structures are built to conduct conventional warfare and they are called do not have the resources or capability to meet the myriad of requirements within stability operation. Recent counterinsurgency operations have focused on the reduction of insurgents in stability operations, but have not addressed the myriad of social problems that continue to allow for dissent toward an existing or developing national governmental body.

The divide between military end states and national end states requires increased discussion, training, integration and study in supporting future military operations and political engagements. The Department of State (DOS) attempts to traverse and support this dearth of knowledge is through the Civilian Reaction Corps (CRC). The CRC at full strength with 2000-trained personnel is still smaller than an U.S. Army brigade sized

unit.[23] Thus it remains that DOS is still woefully short of the resources it requires to execute even its routine operations let alone complex operations.

If a military operation is deemed economically or politically impracticable, based off the development of IMOs along operation transitions in support of national end states, a proactive approach is required to support increased development toward the normalization of a political relationship through engagement. This process in the political context requires the same discussion of national end states as is required in the military context. This discussion should be planned and supported by all USG Agencies in order to collaborate and synchronize military, political and social engagements that are beneficial to the nation's interest. The use if concepts such as IMOs are key to the success of future whole of government operation planning.

The current system of interagency interaction does not support holistic, collaborative or synchronized government planning or support and requires further discussion and study. The USG Agencies identify problems that affect a relationship or problem between the agency or government and an outside region, government, or organization. The USG Agency affected by the problem, often works to mitigate issues internally with its own resources. The same may be said within agencies (ex. Department of Defense) and supporting agencies (ex. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force, Department of the Navy, etc.). The National Security Council becomes involved in the process only when it is determined to be a larger problem that exceeds an agency capability to handle it. Then

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[23] Schnaubelt, Christopher M., "Complex Operations and Interagency Operational Art," Center for Complex Operations, *PRISM* Vol. I, No. 1, (December 2009): pps. 37-50.

two or three other USG agencies will work together to find the problem's resolution. The problem may be a product of multiple interrelated problems that need to be addressed or supported over the long term. Thus to address one smaller problem at the expense of several other problems could compound into a potential catastrophic problem. In the future, discussion of problems may identify proactive peaceful approachs are cost effective in the long-term.

Social problems have increasingly engaged planners across all realms of the USG and partner nations and need to be discussed and studied. The economic and infrastructure capability and viability of a region affects the stability and welfare of a population. Lack of political capability and concern for a population can breed problems that are insurmountable to overcome and provide the impetus for continued conflict. Extremism - national, religious, ethnic and social - impact populations on a basic level through harsh ideology and threats toward individuals, families, tribes, groups, organizations, and nations that are different from those holding extreme ideologies. Environmental conditions that negatively impact populations are likely to spur resource conflicts in the future.[24] These are but a few of the social problems that exist.

Defined operation transitions provide placeholders to facilitate resources and IMOs in support of military and national end states. Operation transitions are defined and planned for just as other tactical tasks, objectives and missions are planned for. Operation transitions are key points in a greater engagement, where commanders can influence and win battles in stability operations. Operation transitions provide structure

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[24] Ministry of Defence, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), "Strategic Trends Programme, Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040," 09 February 2010, pps. 104-118

for forecasting the problems, understanding the problems, and facilitating of the discussions of the problem (gaining of facts and assumptions) while providing the framework to set end states and objectives in support of the resolution of the problems. Combatant commanders and planners, through the discussion of operation transitions, increase their situational awareness of problems that exist around an identified or perceived threat to understand the military, political and social impacts and responsibilities once conventional conflict has ceased.

Operation transitions also provide for an open conversation among combatant commanders and planners, interagency personnel, coalition partners and interested groups to understand the military, political and social conditions that affect an identified population and region. Defined operation transitions complement the framework that supports the plan for military, political and social objectives with the support of end states and resources. Operation transition construction along the six phase joint planning construct allows for the discussion of all the problems early in the process, identification of a path toward resolution of the existing problems, and the identification of requirements and resources that will support the nation's interest. Operation transitions also provide feedback early in the process of the costs and required resources in support of a contingency or operation plan under the execution of a commander or administrator. Lastly, operation transitions allow for the integration of strategic to tactical to communicate operation goals to targeted populations, forecasting and meeting those goals.

Operation transitions are a part of a framework for proactive discussion of the problems, prior to the execution of the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Environment

and the Joint Operations Planning Process that will likely impact and increase the engagement of United States of America in the future.

In the view of the author that the research fully supports the thesis: Operation transitions are an essential framework for addressing tactical tasks with strategic resources in support of national end states.

APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

CJCS – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CMETL – Combat Mission Essential Task List

COCOM – Combatant Command

CONOPS – Contingency Operations

CONPLANS – Contingency Plans

CTC - Combat Training Centers

DMETL – Deployment Mission Essential Task List

DOD – United States Department of Defense

DOS – United States Department of State

FM – Field Manual

GEF - Global Employment of the Force

GO – Government Organization

IGO – International Government Organization

IMOs – Intermediate Military Objectives

JIPOE - Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment

JOPP – Joint Operational Planning Process

JOPES – Joint Operations Planning and Execution System

JP – Joint Publication

JSCP - Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

LOOs – Logical Lines of Operation

MOE – Measure of Effectiveness

MOP – Measure of Performance

NCA - National Command Authority

NDS - National Defense Strategy

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

NMS - National Military Strategy

NSC – National Security Council

NSS - National Security Strategy

OPLANS – Operation Plans

OSD – Office of the Secretary of Defense

PMESII – Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information

QDR - Quadrennial Defense Review

RSO&I - Reception, Staging, Onward-movement & Integration

SECDEF – Secretary of Defense

TO&E - Table of Organization and Equipment

TPFDD - Time Phased Force Deployment Data

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

USG – United States Government

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Major Jonathan Otto has served as an Officer in the United States Army since 1994, and is currently a student at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. Jon initially served as an Armor Officer where he held the positions of Tank Platoon Leader, Squadron Liaison Officer and a Brigade Headquarters Company Executive Officer in Germany. He returned to the United States and transitioned to a Military Intelligence Officer where he served as an Infantry Battalion Intelligence Officer, Russian Analysis Control Team Officer in Charge, a Direct Support Military Intelligence Commander, Division Intelligence Planner, Division Deputy Analysis Control Element Chief, Brigade Intelligence Officer and as a Brigade Support Battalion Operations Officer at Ft. Campbell, Kentucky.

During his tenure in the Army, Jon has deployed on three operational deployments to Bosnia and Kosovo and three combat deployments to Iraq. Major Otto is a recipient of multiple awards, medals and citations for meritorious service, achievement, unit service and deployment participation. He has also earned the United States Army Airborne and Air Assault Badges.

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Jonathan Otto was born in Ohio in 1971, and grew up in Burnsville, Minnesota. He graduated from the University of Wisconsin – Stevens Point in 1994. He is married to Laurie Otto of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and they have two children.